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Peter Bendixen
The Rationale of Crisis Management – On the Handling 
of Coincidence in Economic Situations
The subject of this essay is too complex a problem as to cover all details in depth and, thus, draws its atten-
tion only to core aspects of the handling of coincidence leaving out sophisticated studies and analytic find-
ings as well as detailed reference to economic literature though there is not very much. On the other hand, 
for a lot of actual as well as general reasons, the subject is too important a matter as to ignore the serious 
methodological problems of crisis management, which are rooted in some politically still active bias hidden 
in orthodox neo-classical economics (Stiglitz 2010). 
If crisis management continues to follow traditional rationales, it will fail realizing the increasing dy-
namic of crises within the globalising economies of the world. No existing economy can be considered as an 
isolated system of its own embedded in a stable composition of societal surroundings. Obviously, many a 
critical situation has its origin in the sphere of civilization, of political discrepancies, and of administrative 
inflexibilities. On the other hand, any grave amplitude of markets would touch the entire social surround-
ing. The belief in the markets’ strength of self-regulation is a dangerous construction of orthodox economics 
(Bendixen 2009b, 2010).
The view on crises suggested here is that of a holistic approach to understand a critical situation. Any inter-
pretation of a situation includes empirical dates and figures based on analytic research, but solving a problem 
is not an act of logical derivation from findings, as if a solution can be excavated in the mud of reality by em-
pirical studies only. Empirical figures report events of the past; the future does not reveal any empiricism. This 
would be a contradiction in itself. The end of a crisis as well as the search for solutions to fight the problems 
revealed is unavoidably a view into the future. Therefore, the rationale of crisis management cannot be made 
of pure empiricism but should include a far reaching vision of the future emerging from holistic understanding 
of the situation as a whole.
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What is Crisis Management like  
and what is its Rationale?
A crisis of the business cycle differs from a lunar 
eclipse by the fact that it cannot be forecasted. Any 
attempt to alert the public and expert at an early 
stage about an emerging crisis is a sort of prophecy 
more than a safe projection. The reason is simply the 
impossibility of fixing a definite beginning of a criti-
cal situation and of analyzing it by presupposing a 
clear causality of its courses.1 Historical developments 
are not connected by logic but by series of countless 
tiny little and some grave events, which can coinci-
dentally culminate in a crisis. Each single decision of 
acting individuals challenged by problematic situa-
tion contains choices. Individuals make their choice 
according to their principles and cultural patterns of 
living and their intentions, which are as unique as the 
fingerprint. 
1 To be clear: Even the orbit of the moon is not absolutely deter-
mined, other than Isaac Newton once claimed. But, the aberra-
tion is so imperceptibly small that unforeseeable irregularities 
of the entire planetary system will happen only within probab-
ly billions of years time. There is no determination in the world, 
either in nature or in the world of human culture.
The past, which is often taken as an empirically 
backed collection of facts, is nothing but a construc-
tion of realized choices, which reveals no rational logic 
other than that of a certain continuity of human be-
haviour. Therefore, mathematically constructed mod-
els such as the famous neo-classical market mechanics 
presented in textbooks to explain market processes 
towards a computable equilibrium are worthless. 
They are didactically risky, because they might lead 
students to believe in economic appearances as some-
thing principally manageable by the logic of rational 
methodologies. 
The discrepancy between historical reality and 
traditional economic methodologies based on the 
rationality of pure logic operations reveals the core 
problem of crisis management, the rationale of which 
is mainly rooted in orthodox (neo-classical) economic 
theories. This is the subject of this article under the 
specific experience that, in the moment of a small or 
grave challenge to make a choice, most real situations 
are threatened by coincidences. At present, we are 
witnessing the big market break of the international 
finance system including its radiation into the indus-
trial production sectors. This current crisis can – ironi-
cally, of course – be welcomed as a perfect case study 
to demonstrate the real and the didactical problem 
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of crisis management based on pure economic ratio-
nality.2 
Any crisis contains some instruction, which can eas-
ily be ignored or rebounded from the surface of fro-
zen convictions. The unexpected market break of the 
international finance sector has by many an expert 
and economist been taken as an affront to the holy 
belief of the self-regulating forces of a free market 
economy. This belief is one of the highlight examples 
of historically frozen convictions based on the postu-
late of rationality and determination. 
The typical reaction has been a call for crisis man-
agement and a hasty grip into the arsenal of urgent 
measures to set countervailing forces going. Another 
typical reaction, which is even more problematic, is 
the insisting on the traditional belief in the healing 
effect of the “invisible hand of the market”.3 A more 
sophisticated reaction could have been the idea that 
there might be something basically wrong with the 
rational conception of traditional crisis management.4 
However, there are still scientific initiatives to come 
that would strive for learning the lesson from the fi-
nancial crisis of our days.
Crisis management is part of the basics, which each 
economist in training has got to acquire, in order to 
react in a rational way, whenever and wherever a criti-
cal development is arising. Rationalism, which is the 
fundament of crisis management, goes far back to 
the early philosophy of René Descartes (1596 – 1650) 
and the long and deep channel of implementing and 
unfolding the tradition of rational approach in rather 
every academic field. Economics is not an exception in 
this. But, philosophical rationalism á la Descartes has 
created a methodological strand within sciences. It 
should not be crossed or intermingled with economic 
rationality based on the principal of calculated use of 
scarce resources.
The concept of crisis management consists in 
principle of the following elements: Perception and 
interpretation of a critical situation or phenomenon, 
2 It should also be absolutely clear that arguing against econo-
mic rationality does not mean banishing rationality out of the 
real economy and of economics as such but criticize its sole 
reign in the methodologies and didactics of economics. Moreo-
ver, the criticism on pure economic rationality suggested here 
is mainly focussed on the neoclassical mainstream. It should 
be mentioned that, besides the mainstream, there are many 
opposing or even contradicting theoretical positions in econo-
mics as well as in business administration theories. 
3 Adam Smith is said to have introduced this metaphor into 
economic discourses. But, the truth is that Smith never used it 
connected to the market and he did not invent this metaphor. 
Those, who claim Adam Smith as the author, have never read 
the only passage, wherein he used these words in his famous 
book on The Wealth of Nations. More details can be found Bendi-
xen (2009b).  
4 For more details see: Norman et al. (2000). For German readers 
also see Hutzschenreuter, Griess-Nega, Hrs. (2006). 
developing a strategy to tackle the case, and finally 
to implement counteraction. The methodological 
alignment is based on the clarifying power of ratio-
nal thinking and the scientifically underpinned ap-
plication of research instruments proved and tested 
through generations of scientists and experts.5 Em-
pirical studies on facts and situations of the economic 
reality, for instance in decision making processes, usu-
ally end up with a set of alternatives, which have to 
be evaluated according to the purposes of the acting 
individual or system. The final decision, then, is noth-
ing but a logic deduction. 
The methodological dilemma of this rationale is 
twofold. On the one hand, crisis management starts 
to operate only when the crisis is already on its way 
and has become obvious. The problem here is that 
the time for sophisticated reactions is soon becom-
ing limited and is increasingly narrowing the margin 
for creative interventions. Especially excluded is any 
endeavour to transform the acting system itself to a 
new path of development by a sophisticated strategy 
of system navigation.6 This would be the rationale of 
long-term crisis management, which avoids a mere 
grip into the archive of orthodox measures.  
On the other hand, the traditional rationale of crisis 
managements turns the view away from the existence 
of coincidences in the outside world. Coincidences can 
– by definition – not be forecasted and not excluded. 
They are essentials of life and their appearances do 
not obey any causality. Coincidences are undoubtedly 
a reality in the economy. Their real existence can be 
inferred from the large sector of insurance businesses. 
An insurance company can, of course, not avoid the 
appearance of coincidences, but can absorb damages 
and losses in cases of deviation of normal occurrences. 
Insurance companies are ready to balance accidents 
only within a certain margin of expectations. But, 
they would exclude quite unusual occurrences. Count-
ability remains the nucleus of the rationale of insur-
ance businesses. 
The big crisis of the international finance markets, 
which dramatically proceeded its influence to the real 
economy7, did definitely meet no insurance service of 
any company in the world. Occurrences such as mar-
ket breaks are considered to be quite normal risks of 
every company involved in businesses. Governmental 
aid is, seen from the strict platform of the free mar-
ket economy, a sin against the principles of the free 
market, which cannot but leave normal risks to the 
5 See Fink (2000); Mitroff;Anagnos (2005); Harvard Business 
School Press (Compiler) (2004). 
6 See Laszlo (2001, 2006). 
7 The term “real economy” is a curious idea, as it says in the op-
posite that the finance sector is not real, as if the real economy 
could work without its services or as if the finance sector could 
exist without any material production on the bottom of the 
economy.
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participants in market decisions. Those who are not 
armed to cope with the uncertainties of market pro-
cesses should leave the play ground. 
The big crisis of the international finance markets 
is, indeed, dramatic and destructive, but it is an event 
caused by internal discrepancies within the markets, 
not by external interventions from a non-economic 
part. Reckless greed of gain, veiling of the true char-
acter of financial products, and finally unpardonable 
mismanagement are clearly no external factors. 
But, the fact that governments all over the world 
have started aid according to the possibilities given 
by the fiscal budgets and the specific social situation 
of the respective country reveals another, mostly not 
reflected fact: the market is not isolated from the 
rest of the society. Orthodox economics claims that 
social aspects do not have anything to do with ratio-
nality and, therefore, are subject on sociologists only. 
Erich Streissler, an Austrian economist, wrote: Es ist 
keineswegs nur ein Bonmot, sondern eine erhellende Aus-
sage, dass der Ökonom rationales Handeln untersucht, 
der Soziologe dagegen irrationales8 [It is not simply 
a witticism, but an illuminative statement that the 
economist would research rational acting, while the 
sociologist’s subject is irrationality].
The elimination of the existence of abstract entities 
such as society or market is a problematic reduction 
of spiritual or mental processes down to the sheer 
facts of physical objects and constellations such as 
resources, money, products, real estates, technical 
equipments, and assets. It has cemented the convic-
tion that economic phenomena can be managed by 
rational approach analogue to the construction of ma-
chines and that any mental or ideological influence 
can be and has to be excluded.9  
The truth, however, is different: What happens 
physically on the bottom of the economy belongs to 
the material world of production along the chain from 
extracting resources from the nature to the deposits 
at the end of consumption. This process has, of course, 
to be managed, which is in each single unit involved 
the sense and business of the enterprise and on the 
macro-level a matter of economic policy.  But, how 
can these processes be administered without the men-
tal, imaginative power of one’s brain, in which ideas 
and perspectives are generated under the command 
of norms, aims, and cultural patterns of living and act-
ing? What ever human beings start to do, has its mo-
tivating origin always in the specific organ called the 
8 Streissler (2004, 165).
9 This is empiricism on the bottom of individualism, which re-
minds of a dictum of the former British Prime Minister Marga-
ret Thatcher: There is no such thing as society. Criticism on or-
thodox economic though is not quite new, but usually happens 
outside economics, for example from philosophical perspecti-
ves. See Brodbeck (2009); Bendixen (2010).
human brain. Humans are probably the only beings 
equipped with a brain to think beyond the physical 
world and to construct ideas, how to shape the given 
nature. 
This is the heart of culture, and it should be rather 
clear that any economic actions are always rooted 
in the sphere of spirituality and creativity and that 
the outcome of it, the material world of factories 
and products10, is subordinate. Is it acceptable to 
consider economics as a science, which is focussed 
on something subordinate? As thinking always goes 
ahead and as the individual architecture of one’s 
mind is shaped by the internalization of impressive 
experience the individual mind is a living carrier of 
the ruling cultural patterns of the respective society 
or finally of the world civilization. This fact creates 
the hierarchy of mental operations over physical op-
erations. Economics without reflecting the dimension 
of culture is a real problem.
Within the sphere of thinking and imagination, 
there is no causality, even no pure rational logic, ex-
cept perhaps the organic processes of the brain. Cre-
ativity is not rooted in reason, but in the power of the 
unconscious and the vitality of intuition.11 It is not 
bound to necessities, but to the contingency of brain-
waves, which can be caught by a vivid reason like fish 
in a lake. Coincidence of that kind, not necessities of 
logic thinking, is the ground of creativity.12 We are 
now turning to the problem of coincidence, which is 
the great antagonist of crisis management.
The Coincidence lurks in the Future
The basic problem we are facing in any actions chal-
lenging situation is connected to the fact that we 
cannot change the past, while we are given a broad 
horizon of options in the future none of them being 
safe. This is, indeed, a simple statement. But, is the 
past due to its irreversibility really a safe platform 
to manage the future including the management of 
crises? In other words, can we learn from the past? 
The brief answer is: yes, but not in the simple way of 
studying historical facts. Historical facts are frozen fu-
tures; they are the result of decisions among choices 
under the command of uncertainty in perceiving a 
world horizon and within it in recognizing perspec-
tives captured on specific platform.
Another point here is that the objectification of a 
cultural idea is in two aspects a reaction on the forces 
10 In this, producing a commodity is analogue to producing a 
piece of art. Both carry an idea or a mission rooted in the mind 
of the producer. A piece of art, however, carries a highly sophis-
ticated, sometimes even enigmatic mission, while the material 
object as such is nothing but a physical medium. The mission 
of a commodity is its cultural meaning and social function in-
cluding its role as a carrier of profit.
11 See Gigerenzer (2008a); Murphy (2010); Vedantam (2010). 
12 See Zeilinger (2008). 
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of coincidence: One of them is the influence of unfore-
seeable forces during the phase of creating a shape in 
one’s mind. The other one is the permanent influence 
of physical forces during the phase of physical realiza-
tion and the follow-up existence of such objectifica-
tions. Physical objects, be they of natural or cultural 
origin, are permanently exposed, for instance, to the 
laws of thermodynamics and the growth of entropy. 
Nothing exists forever. Therefore, nobody can be safe 
about his perception of the presence and his expecta-
tions of the future. But, due to the capability of learn-
ing lessons from experience and accumulating knowl-
edge about the outside reality, human beings are not 
defencelessly exposed to the tyranny of nature and 
coincidence.
The function of reason and the role of the ratio is 
that of a clarifier, which may not in any case guar-
antee a perfect success, but helps to cope with the 
problem of coincidence. The obvious proof of success 
is the fact that many a cultural object turns out to 
survive for a long period of existence without being 
destroyed and that often cultural objects traced back 
even to hundreds of years are still in use in the pres-
ence. Seen from this point of view, we can declare 
culture as the triumph over the forces of coincidence 
or as a lasting revolt of human creativity against the 
forces of coincidence. But, as the appearance of crises 
demonstrates, success would be no good reason to 
believe in human capability of mastering the world.
With respect to the rationale of crisis management, 
the interpretation of culture just described can be 
taken as a first approach to cope with crises. Creat-
ing culture is not simply producing a physical world 
on an industrialized level of technical produces, it is 
rather the prime phase of thinking and perceiving the 
future as an open field of uncertainty and a chance 
of discovering and installing norms and structures 
ahead, although the future cannot be perfectly con-
trolled. Crisis management, therefore, can neither be 
based only on empirical facts of the past13 nor can it 
be designed on the base of sophisticated mathemati-
cal models to determine a fixed strategy. Managing a 
crisis may be supported by models, but at the end, it 
is a kind of navigation in a coincidental world, which 
needs the power of intuition.14
This statement is a serious argument against the 
idea that in principle the past would deliver safe pat-
terns of behaviour in the future and against the op-
timism of orthodox economics to rationally control 
economic developments especially business cycles 
13 Present facts ascertained by empirical investigation are part 
of the past. The presence has no real existence other than the 
infinitesimal border between the future and the past.
14 See Gigerenzer (2008b).  German Edition: Gigerenzer, Gerd. 
2008. Bauchentscheidungen – Die Intelligenz des Unbewuss-
ten und die Macht der Intuition, 3.ed. München.
shattering the financial markets. To underline these 
arguments, it may be helpful to realize that steps to-
wards the future in looking at the past is very similar 
to a driver, who would permanently look into the driv-
ing mirror when being on his way ahead. 
Believing in the rationale of sophisticated math-
ematical models is among economists the main road 
of crisis management, as it reveals some crucial ad-
vantages. The most important one is the concept that 
a model, which has been proved to be successful in 
applying to situations of slight marginal deviations 
from the standards, would allow a very fast solution 
when being fed with empirical facts about the situa-
tion. A tested model is in itself a kind of rationaliza-
tion of refined analyses and of producing solutions. 
The methodological problem is twofold: working with 
a mathematical, computer-aided model (the so-called 
econometrics) depends on a correct copying of the 
main structural components of an economic situation 
and it depends on the stability of the real economic 
world to be close to itself in not producing accidental 
deviations from the standards.
Both cannot be guaranteed, because the basic 
structures of a living economic system is perma-
nently chancing. Referring to the simple concept that 
the equilibrium of the market reveals automatically 
from the free balance of market powers is too weak a 
specification as to be adequate for sophisticated cal-
culations. The core problem here is the fact that the 
structures of the markets are not of physical nature 
– counting the annual general domestic production in 
term of money is a naïve approach in this case - , but 
of mental substance and finally of cultural norms and 
patterns, which cannot be fixed for ever like the con-
struction of a bridge according to the law of gravita-
tion.
Undoubtedly, neither the nature nor the basic struc-
tures of culture, once organically emerged from long 
lasting historical practice, would make abrupt leaps 
in their developments. But, the reality within these 
structures – quite apart from grave forces to even 
change these structures by the time – is oscillating 
within broad margins, and it is these realities that 
would make the future unclear and unpredictable and 
that creates coincidental appearances containing the 
power of crisis. 
Therefore, the rationale of crisis management de-
mands a concept and instrumental design that does 
not insist in empirical facts only as a safe platform 
to start from and does not rely on the axiom of pure 
rationalism, which dominated economics for genera-
tions originated in the time of enlightenment in the 
18th century, when the philosophy of René Descartes 
and the scientific mighty deeds of Isaac Newton in 
mechanical physics ruled the spirit of the time. In-
stead, crisis management (here focussed on economic 
affairs) should be based on the philosophy that un-
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derstanding the world of the markets and economies 
is an act of mental construction, not an act of empiri-
cal research in the physical world and that the coin-
cidence is undeniably in the world influencing if not 
dominating the fate of the society or civilization. 
If pure ratio and logic systems of modelling the 
world are no promising approaches to cope with cri-
ses, because a crisis it defined as a dangerous devia-
tion from the standards and threatens in a concrete 
situation the existence of a firm, a national economy 
or a state, crisis management must be rooted in high-
er levels of intelligent approach to the real world. This 
is what I am now going to deal with.  
The Intelligence of the Unconscious
The majority of everyday situations challenge an-
swers and reactions based on routine, experience, 
spontaneity, and intuition with only few, if that, ra-
tional analysis. The methodological traditions of aca-
demic scientific research would deny the wisdom of 
such approaches as irrational. Especially economists 
would claim the priority of rational decision making 
as the silver bullet of finding an optimum of success 
in the business world. No doubt, it depends on what 
we are striving for when inventing a theory, whether 
we accept a growing distance to the reality, in or-
der to discover the inner logic of a social system, or 
we approach the reality, in order to learn operating 
successfully in it. Economics, as is presumed in this 
article, has a strongly pragmatic character based on 
philosophical, especially cultural interpretations of 
the world of economic phenomena. Part of this is its 
methodological approach towards the cultural dimen-
sion of economic activities. 
The pragmatic realism just described does not op-
pose the necessity of rational logic conclusions, but 
realizes the fact that practicing logic argumentation 
you need before substantial material to apply on. Why 
discussing about a hammer, if there is nothing to be 
fixed with nails? All the many tools elaborated and 
tested in business administration do not make much 
sense, if nobody knows the complex substantial chal-
lenges emerging from its uncertainties and the incom-
plete knowledge about the horizon of its impacts in 
the future.
Therefore, the perception of the reality, the estima-
tion of its potential of creative challenges, the holistic 
grasping of its profiles without perfect information, 
and many more approaches to understand a situa-
tion has to be the first step, before the ability of our 
ratio can start bringing the intuitive and mostly un-
systematic cognitions into a logic order. The latter is, 
as was mentioned before, the necessary bridge into 
the world of real constructions under the command of 
natural laws and social limits. 
The unconscious is a kind of intelligence of its own, 
and it may be worth looking at its usefulness in con-
crete situations. It may be recommendable listening 
to one’s intuition and discovering a quick solution in-
stead of initiating a complicated analysis, in order to 
feel safe enough in underpinning one’s decision. In 
many cases the real situation may have changed its 
profile in the meantime with the effect that the result 
of the analysis does not fit any more. But, this is not 
typical in the pragmatic world of business and real 
management. As we can observe, a well-experienced 
manager normally has a safe feeling for the time lim-
its to react adequately in a concrete situation. His in-
tuition would tell him, when it is time to stop further 
investigation and to act. 
The stock-exchanges are an interesting field of ob-
serving the actions and reactions of brokers on the 
very quick movements of the stock-market prices. 
It may also put a light on the power of intuition by 
interviewing one of the speculators, who would cer-
tainly confess that they prefer intuition based on life-
long experience in the very field instead of relying on 
detailed analyzes. We also could fill books in telling 
stories about stock-exchange analysts disseminat-
ing recommendations to their clients about sales or 
purchases of shares and producing a lot of failures 
and losses. Why? They operate with computer aided 
analysis programmes based on the logic of economic 
or econometric rational models that exclude intuition 
and holistic views. But, the economic reality does not 
care models, but gambles with coincidences.
The intelligence of the unconscious15 and the power 
of intuition are obvious when observing, for instance, 
a football match. None of the football players could 
be successful, if he tries to back up each step by a de-
tailed analysis of each current situation of the match. 
Each of his steps and movements is an intuitive act 
following a high-speed survey of the situation, which 
stimulates corresponding experience laid down in his 
memory. Success in scoring a goal is never based on 
rational analysis.
This statement may provoke some counter-argu-
ments referring to the fact that it would be a waste of 
good chances, if someone reacts on a concrete situa-
tion in a spontaneous way although time may be giv-
en for underpinning one’s decision by a solid research 
of details. Furthermore, there are highly complicated 
situations in the reality, which cannot be efficiently 
handled by a primitive set of rules of thumb. Such ob-
jections are serious and reveal another truth saying 
that the decision, whether or not there is time given 
for solid empirical research, is in itself not a mere ra-
tional decision. The mega level of deciding about the 
intensity of rational clarifying a situation is in itself 
not rationally calculable. 
Underlining this once again as the crucial point: in 
reality or, precisely speaking, in a concrete situation 
15 The term refers to Gigerenzer (2008a).
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we are not confronted to deciding between, on the 
one hand, pure rationality and on the other hand, the 
total surrender to the tyranny of the unconscious. The 
truth lies in balancing both, while the real point of 
good balance depends on the concrete elements und 
forces of a given situation. Rationality may be an 
abstract ideal expressing human beings’ will to com-
mand the world, but it is a wrong ethic, if it is meant 
as the silver bullet in a complex, non-determined, co-
incidental reality.
The problem of decision making in most cases of 
the reality, especially in an unexpected market break 
that we are witnessing these days in the international 
financial sector, is neither that of simply applying re-
fined models and instruments of economic rationality 
nor that of vague prophecy rooted in pure intuition. 
It is, instead, the task to pave the way and to find a 
balance in between, which could lead in the long run 
to a sustainable, though not ever lasting, state of the 
respective field or, if you want, the human civilization 
a such. This decision is not a simple choice between 
two alternatives, but is a prospect based on experi-
ence and inspired by the power of intuition. It is a 
modus operandi, which is focussed on discovering the 
whole instead of disassembling the situation in its ele-
ments and then to classify and aggregate them, as it 
is common in microeconomics.
Culture as a Produce of Coincidence  
and Creativity
Understanding the reality as a mental construction 
based on incomplete knowledge, unsolved problems, 
and unexpected appearances means demanding ad-
equate reactions. It is the openness of situations that 
challenges creativity and pushes innovation, not the 
notion of social, including economic phenomena as 
a system the mechanisms of which can be managed 
by rational tools of problem solving. There is a fun-
damental connection between creativity and coinci-
dence. I am now turning to this query.
If a situation is unclear and if there exists a serious 
challenge to find a solution how to react on it, one of 
the most important abilities of human beings comes 
to the forefront: the spirit of invention or creativity 
to discover a viable path. There is obviously a logic re-
lation between a situation of unknown outcome and 
the threat of failure, on the one hand, and the psy-
chological stimulation of creativity to find acceptable 
solutions, on the other hand. 
Wherever pure determination prevails in a given 
system, everything happens under the command of 
logic and rational conclusion. Economic models of 
the market equilibrium are of that kind – but they 
are rather unrealistic. It is the fact that the reality 
we are living in is composed of some sustainable 
structures, some unchangeable objects and constel-
lations mainly those of the nature, and a majority 
of unknown or uncertain factors, forces, conditions, 
and movements. 
This is the realm of coincidence, and it is the spe-
cific mental equipment of human beings to feel chal-
lenged to fight the destructive work of coincidences 
by creating walls of defence. A building is a defence 
against bad weather conditions; a dam is a defence 
against the flood; a palace is a defence against the 
coarseness of the primitive, a cathedral is a defence 
against the unbelief, a painting is a defence of imagi-
nation against the superficial of the obvious, and so 
on. We can conclude that culture is the defence of 
mankind against the undeniable work of the powerful 
work of coincidence lurking in the future of natural 
appearances as well as of human goals and deeds. The 
power of human culture or, in other word: of human 
civilization is rooted in the intelligence of creativity.
Unclear situations, in which we suppose coinci-
dences to appear, which may influence the objective 
constellations and stimulate the creativity of human 
intelligence, demand mental, emotional and finally 
physical actions to find a way out. In case of a situa-
tion that extends far into the future, human creativ-
ity does not have the character of solving a current 
problem but of thinking ahead about generalized 
prevention against unwelcome influences of the na-
ture or of social deviations from common convictions 
and beliefs. Prevention is a nucleus element of human 
culture, and it is an intelligent augmentation of what 
animals do instinctively by nature, for instance, con-
structing a nest or building a swarm as an intelligent 
defence against robbers. 
The cultural achievements of mankind are based in 
mental perception and imaginative contemplation. 
Not all of them would end up in physical objects, but 
remain on the level of thoughts, convictions, moral 
norms, aesthetical preferences, and patterns of living. 
Spirituality includes the individuals’ mental imprint-
ing of their memory based on life-long experiences 
with the natural and social surrounding and it em-
braces as well the cultural spirit. Even if a material ob-
ject emanates from human creativity, for example the 
grand palace constructed by a famous architect, its 
origin is rooted in the mental capacity of the creator 
to reflect the situation he is confronted with and to 
suggest that building as his solution of the task. Indi-
vidual imprints of the brain mirror social cultural pat-
terns. This is the abstract reality of social culture, and 
it is the only way to ascribe social culture the quality 
of real existence.  
We can conclude now as a core statement that co-
incidence is undeniable in the world and that is does 
not make sense to eliminate its real existence but to 
positively create culture as an attempt to repel the 
effects of unexpected, destructive coincidences or 
power of natural forces including that of entropy. But, 
it would be disastrous, if the coincidence will be con-
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sidered only as something negative and destructive. 
Coincidences can be a chance for something positive. 
If it happens, we would call it happiness, as everybody 
knows from games of hazard, which, in the case of a 
lottery, is an organized provocation of the coincidence. 
However, why not consider the future as an open field 
of non-fixed appearances containing a broad range of 
creativity challenging stimulations?
Crisis Management to handle  
the Coincidence
At the heart of crisis management, stand-by capaci-
ties prevail, which would be activated only in case 
of upcoming events of some existential relevance. 
The characteristics of crises are the fact that nobody 
knows the crucial details of its appearance; neither its 
date nor its locality; neither its profile nor its substan-
tial qualities. The coincidence is defined as an event 
that cannot be forecasted, because its unexpected ap-
pearance cannot be derived from any causality based 
on determination.
This is the general view upon coincidences. But they 
are not all the same. An earthquake cannot be predict-
ed due to a lack of knowledge about geological strain 
constellations and the real trigger of a stroke. A traffic 
jam cannot be predicted due to the unpredictability 
of human behaviour in a specific situation. The for-
mation of a growing internal pressure of the market 
may, at an unknown point, lead to a destructive blast 
or may in the contrary ebb away by the time without 
leaving any damage behind. But, nobody knows ex-
actly, what will when and where and with which char-
acteristics really happen.
The core problem of crisis management, therefore, 
is the risky decision, whether or not an intervention 
into the critical development is recommended and, 
even more fatal than that: which combination of in-
struments for intervention and what dosage would 
be effective. The typical rationale of crisis manage-
ment is a combination of two fundamental basics: 
On the one hand, the crisis manager is braced for 
standardizes cases, the upcoming of which may be 
unclear, while the specific profile and appearance is 
known from experience. On the other hand, the cri-
sis manager or the complete management system fo-
cussed on handling crises are profoundly trained in 
mental flexibility, which embraces a broad horizon of 
experience and knowledge combined with creativity 
and intuition.
The second version is usually not part of academic 
training in economics and business management, as 
it is not even included in scientific research and the-
ories of this scientific field. Case studies, which are 
very often included in the curricula of academic stud-
ies especially in business administration, are usually 
computer aided models that represent pure economic 
rationalism. They are not quite worthless, but do not 
mirror the true reality of managing critical situations 
on whatever pragmatic level. 
Mental flexibility is a problem of its own, because 
normally academic as well as non-academic educa-
tion is a permanent training in applying instruments, 
models and principles of rationality on situations, 
which do not contain very much surprise by coinci-
dences. Have a look at typical economic models: the 
only set of flexible reactions is based on logic opera-
tions to solve the problem of deviations of variables 
or dislocations of constants within a defined margin. 
This means that those models try to standardize co-
incidences. The hidden educational problem, which 
by the way could be observed widely during the first 
phases of the international financial market breaks of 
the year 2007 to 2009 and ongoing, is a lack of encour-
agement in trusting one’s intellectual power of intu-
ition and creativity and of self-confidence of feeling 
encouraged to acting as an experienced pathfinder in 
unclear situations.
Undoubtedly, the mental capacities of being aware 
of meeting the absolutely unexpected coincidence 
and of trusting one’s own wisdom through experience 
would be the true profile of crisis management or, to 
say it in other words: intellectual flexibility based on 
experience is the real rationale of crisis management 
apart from all standardized reaction on phenomena 
in the real world. 
Lessons to learn from the  
International Finance Market Crisis
In principle, there are two different aspects in ob-
serving the current international finance market crisis 
under the perspective of learning for a better under-
standing of the economic world. The first one puts its 
fingers on the genesis of that crisis; the second one is 
focussed on observing the political struggle for solu-
tions and on possible lessons of reconsidering some 
crucial principles and cemented convictions in eco-
nomics.
As to the first aspect, the emergence of the crisis 
can be – in parts –reconstructed as a historical fact. 
But, imagined from the past, when its appearance was 
unclear, it has had at that time the characteristics of 
a future offering a broad range of tackling paths or 
strategies of intelligent navigation. Obviously, grave 
mistakes have been made in governmental economic 
policy (mainly but not only in the US) and in the art of 
business management due to immoral behaviour and 
reckless profit maximizing. 
The main lesson to learn here is the realization that 
the past should be understood as a “frozen future” 
telling the story that the economic reality is far away 
from the ideal of rationality and that it leads to care-
less failures in interpreting complex situations, if the 
open, coincidental character of the future is reduced 
to rational reconstruction and can mastered by mod-
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els and tools of planning and strategic methods of 
problem solving. Experience based creativity and, to 
a certain extent, the trust in intuition is a necessary 
complement, if not in some cases the nucleus of navi-
gating in unclear situations of far reaching horizons.
It may not be possible to include intuition in aca-
demic educational curricula. Academic education is 
usually conceived as a kind of transfer of theoretical 
truth and perception to individuals attending aca-
demic lessons and colloquia. This approach does not 
and probably cannot take up queries of individual en-
couragement to believe in the power and intelligence 
of intuition. But, academic teaching can at least train 
the capability of imagination (in economic affairs) 
and underline the specific conditions of scientific 
creativity followed finally by pragmatic productivity. 
Training the capability of imagination is not an exer-
cise isolated from the main topics of economics and 
business administration, but is an integrated part of 
lessons on economic subjects. Leading a company as 
well as programming economic policy is not a matter 
of the pure logic of system control, but of understand-
ing situations as a whole, of creating visions about its 
future horizons, and, in full consciousness of risks, of 
deciding strategies to cope with the challenges of the 
future – be they jeopardizing or be they promising 
chances.
This is nothing new to business practitioners, but it 
is rarely involved in academic teaching in the field of 
business administration. The didactic problem here 
is the fact that solving problems in business affairs 
is usually wrapped in sophisticated models based on 
mathematic and logic algorithms, which claim to mir-
ror the reality and would lead to rational solutions. 
But in truth, these models cloud the fact that the eco-
nomic reality as well as any other reality never can 
be controlled totally by the rationale of mathematic 
models. Believing the businesses to be a  world of 
logic structures, which can be rationalized by human 
intelligence, is nothing but a construction.16
As to the second aspect, observing the political and 
scientific reaction on a grave crisis such as the mar-
ket break of the international finance sector and its 
radiation to the sector of industrial production can 
be taken as a lesson to understand the enormous dif-
ficulties in reviewing cemented programmes based 
on orthodox theories and models both on the level 
of academic economics and of political programmes. 
The core problem here is the question, how far we 
will have to step down to the bottom of civilized so-
cieties, in order to make a start-up for a reconstruc-
16 The position suggested here is based on the philosophy of 
constructivism as has been developed by Paul Watzlawick and 
many others. See: Watzlawick (1977); Heinz von Foerster (2002); 
Fosnot (2005). From a neurologys point of view see also: Engel, 
Singer (2008).
tion of the fundaments of social values, practices, and 
governing institutions, which are able to consider the 
conditions of promising cultural responses to the big 
changes of the biosphere of the earth. The crisis of 
the international finance markets is, indeed, a grave 
experience. But, does it really challenge a principal 
review of the cultural ground, on which prosperity 
could grow? The answer is not easy and cannot be de-
rived from the logic of empirical facts of the past.
To illustrate this philosophical view, we may consid-
er the role of individual freedom in an open, dynamic 
society. On the one hand, there will be no efficient 
creativity in the society, where there is no individual 
drive to create something of relevance or importance. 
This is not only a matter of economic dynamics, but 
also a matter of other parts of social life, for instance 
politics, the science itself, and the arts. On the other 
hand, if anything goes, if there are no limits and no 
normative structures at all, which can prevent indi-
viduals from unacceptable behaviour, we will soon 
experience a sort of egoism and reckless fights for 
one’s own advantages at the expense of others. Chaos 
would be the end, and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan 
would appear on the stage. How could we find the 
point of balance between a high level of individual 
freedom, which is an ethical value of its own? How 
could we or those, who are responsible for governing 
and administering our common affairs, navigate our 
society including the economy through the future 
without loosing stability?
Descriptions and even some academic interpreta-
tions of the current crisis of the international finance 
markets including the grave interferences into the real 
economy have already been elaborated widely. 17 The 
core questions in the case are addressed to whether 
or not this critical development could have been fore-
shadowed or even concretely predicted.
It is not very difficult to discover that The Crisis is 
rooted in the structures, instrumental equipments, 
economic principles, and specific business conditions 
of the international markets of financial products. It 
is also rather obvious that nobody was able or willing 
to suspect at an early stage, what kind of dangerous 
internal pressure of the financial markets had started 
much earlier than 2007. There have been signals, and 
there have been warnings, but no significant reaction, 
either from within the markets or from governments 
and other supervisory bodies. They all were, as it 
seems, mentally nailed up by the deep and fixed be-
lieves in the orthodox economic models.
This point may be the last lesson to be mentioned 
here: There has been, still is and probably will be an 
enormous lack of business ethics and of entrepreneur-
17 Some examples: Mishkin (2009); Downs (2009); Soros (2008). 
For German readers also: Fischer (2009); Candeias, Rilling 
(2009).
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ial responsibility, which stretches far beyond the lim-
its of the narrow market activities onto the social re-
sponsibility. This, however, does not mean to curtail 
the liberties of the market, which could easily cause 
an irresponsible paralysis of economic dynamics. It 
does not make sense to cut economic power, but to 
civilise its responsible use. The idea is to cultivate 
business governance according to long-term perspec-
tives of human civilization.18 The great theme of our 
days is neither to leave the traces of success due to the 
dynamics of the market economy achieved through 
18 See Peter Bendixen (2009a, 2009b). 
hundreds of years of practice in history nor get corpo-
rate management nor entrepreneurship as such under 
a specific governmental control or command.
The moral of economic behaviour, which would in-
clude political policy and programming on the macro 
level of economic developments, can and should be 
integrated in academic education. Putting courses in 
business ethics will certainly not suffice, because eth-
ics is nothing to be added only, but is a substantial 
dimension of any economic practice and should be-
come a nucleus of theoretical endeavours in econom-
ics and business administration. This would be the 
right academic response to or lesson from The Crisis 
of our days.
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